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The International Protection of Cultural Property:
Some Skeptical Observations
Eric A. Posner*
I. INTRODUCTION
Cultural property refers to property that has some special relationship with
a particular culture or nation state. Cultural property includes objects found at
archeological sites, which provide insight into earlier civilizations, and artworks
produced by members of a culture that are thought to embody or represent that
culture in a distinctive way. The contours of the definition are vague and
shifting, but the controversies over the use of cultural property are real, and raise
important problems for domestic and international law.
There are three controversies of importance today. First, a global black
market in antiquities exported in violation of the domestic law of origin states is
worth billions of dollars. Many of the antiquities are removed from archeological
sites in violation of domestic law, exported in violation of domestic law, and
then traded in places like Switzerland and the United States, ending up in
museums or private collections. Origin states complain that their cultural
heritage is being stolen, and archeologists worry that the goods are being
removed without attention to their archeological context; they are inadequately
stored, recorded, and protected, and ultimately lost to scholarship.1
Second, many antiquities that were not, strictly speaking, stolen or removed
in violation of domestic law are of such great cultural value that origin states are
demanding their return despite the absence of problems with title. The
complaints are thus moral and political, not legal, although often the
circumstances under which the goods were obtained are sufficiently murky that a
* Kirkland & Ellis Professor of Law, The University of Chicago. Thanks to Lior Strahilevitz and
participants at a Conference on Cultural Property at the University of Chicago for helpful
comments.
I For discussions, see the essays in Neil Brodie, Jennifer Doole, and Colin Renfrew, eds, Trade in
IllidtAnfiquiies: The Destuction of the World's Arheological Heritage (McDonald Inst 2001).
Chicago Journal of International Law
claim of theft is made as well. Controversy over whether these goods should be
returned to the origin state has added friction to the relations between states.2
Third, many antiquities are destroyed during wartime. In the first Gulf
War, the US promised not to attack cultural property in Iraq, but ended up
destroying some cultural property when Iraq located military assets in
archeological sites. In the second Gulf War, the US failed to prevent looting of
museums and archeological sites by criminals and ordinary Iraqi citizens. The
looting has resulted in the destruction or disappearance of many antiquities.
The first and third problems have been addressed by international law in
the past. The 1970 UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and
Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural
Property ("UNESCO Convention") provides, among many other things, that
states should respect the export restrictions of origin states.4 Thus, if Italy
forbids people to export Etruscan objects, parties to the convention are
supposed to pass laws that punish people who import Etruscan objects. The
general view is that the UNESCO Convention has failed to halt the trade in
illegally acquired antiquities, and indeed that this trade is far greater today than it
was forty years ago.
The 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the
Event of Armed Conflict ("Hague Convention")' and its two protocols obligate
belligerents to avoid targeting cultural property and to protect it when possible,
and it requires states at peace to take certain measures to protect their own
cultural property in advance of war. The 1954 Hague Convention is also widely,
although not universally, considered a failure. Even putting aside the debacle in
Iraq (which is not governed by the convention because the US is not a party),
the destruction of cultural property has been a feature of dozens of wars and
civil conflicts over the last fifty years.
In this Article, I will argue that both of these legal regimes are
misconceived. Both regimes assume that cultural property is distinctive or
special, and therefore different from ordinary property; however, it turns out
2 See, for example, John Henry Merryman, Thinking about the Elgn Marbles, 83 Mich L Rev 1881
(1985), reprinted in John Henry Merryman, Thinking about the Egin Marbles: Crifical Essays on
Cultural Prvperlj, Art and Law 24 (Kluwer 2000).
3 See US Dept of Defense, Conduct oftbe Persian Gulf War: Final Report to Congress 125-26 (1992).
4 Contention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicity Import, Export and Transfer
of Ownership of Cultural Property (Nov 14, 1970), 823 UN Treaty Ser 231 (1972), available
online at <http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URLID=13039&URLDO=DOTOPIC&
URLSECTION=201.html> (visited Apr 21, 2007).
5 Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict (May 14,
1954), 249 UN Treaty Ser 240, available online at <http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-
URLID=13637&URLDO=DOTOPIC&URLSECTION=201.html> (visited Apr 21, 2007).
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that it is hard to make sense of this assumption. There is no good argument for
international legal regulation of cultural property, during peacetime or wartime. I
argue that the UNESCO Convention likely has perverse effects and that the
treatment of cultural property would improve, even during wartime, if the
current regime of international regulation were abolished.6
II. THE TREATY REGIME
A. INTERNATIONAL LAW OF CULTURAL PROPERTY
1. The Law of Armed Conflict
The laws of war-or international humanitarian law-go back centuries,
but their modern incarnation is conventionally dated to the Hague Peace
Conferences of 1899 and 1907. The Fourth Hague Convention prohibited
belligerents from targeting or intentionally damaging "buildings dedicated to
religion, art, science, or charitable purposes, [and] historic monuments ' ' 7 or
seizing or intentionally damaging "institutions dedicated to religion, charity and
education, the arts and the sciences,... historic monuments, [and] works of art
and science." 8 The rules were subject to an exception for military necessity.
These rules failed to prevent destruction and looting of cultural property on a
massive scale during World War I and World War II.
It should be noted that the Hague Conventions also codified the
longstanding doctrine that belligerent forces should not intentionally damage or
seize private property or state property that does not have a military purpose.
Thus, the Fourth Hague Convention clarified that cultural property was
governed by this doctrine.
In an effort to strengthen the laws protecting cultural property in the wake
of their disastrous failure in World War II, states sent delegates to another
Hague conference in 1954, and the result was the Hague Convention. 9 Its main
provisions established that (i) the parties would prepare for armed conflicts by
taking steps to safeguard cultural property;'1 and (ii) belligerents would protect
their own cultural property (for example, by not exposing it to hostile fire),
6 The vast majority of authors writing about this topic criticize the existing international legal
regime for being too lax. See, for example, Jeanette Greenfield, The Return of Cultural Treasures
257-61 (Cambridge 2d ed 1996); Patrick J. O'Keefe, Trade in Antiquities: Reducing Destruction and
Theft 103-05 (UNESCO 1997). A few dissenters will be noted below.
7 Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land (1907), art 27, 36 Stat 2277
(1910).
8 Id, art 56.
9 Hague Convention (cited in note 5).
10 Id, art 3.
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refrain from targeting cultural property except in case of military necessity, and
protect cultural property from vandalism and theft." Other provisions required
parties to give appropriate training to their soldiers and to impose criminal
punishments on people who violate the Hague Convention. A protocol further
required occupying powers to prevent people from removing cultural property
from occupied territory.'2 A second protocol, 3 signed in 1999, provided clearer
and more detailed obligations, created several international crimes relating to the
mistreatment of cultural property, extended the protections to internal conflicts,
and created a committee with responsibility for administering the treaty regime.' 4
One-hundred sixteen states have ratified the 1954 Convention as of 2006.15
Ninety-three states have ratified the First Protocol 16 and forty-four states-most
of them small or poor-have ratified the Second Protocol. 7
The conventional wisdom appears to be that the treaty regime has failed in
its purpose to limit the destruction of cultural property. "Failure," however, is an
ambiguous term, and we can distinguish several different meanings.
One indication of failure is simply that cultural property continues to be
destroyed during wartime. Examples include the destruction of cultural objects
during the Iran-Iraq war, the first Gulf War (when Iraq looted and destroyed
Kuwaiti Museums), and the Yugoslav civil war. Belligerents did not merely fail to
prevent looting; they engaged in looting and destruction as a war strategy.
Peacetime destruction of cultural property, such as the famous depredations of
the Taliban against Afghan cultural property, also occurred.' 8 Another indication
of failure is that even the relatively light peacetime obligations-involving
11 Id, art 4.
12 Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed
Conflict (May 14, 1954), 249 UN Treaty Ser 358.
13 Second Protocol to the Hague Cultural Property Convention of 1954 (Mar 26, 1999), 38 ILM
769.
14 For a lucid overview, see Patrick J. Boylan, The Concept of Cultural Protection in Times of Armed
Conflict: From the Crusades to the New Millennium, in Neil Brodie and Kathryn Walker Tubb, eds, Illdt
Antiquities: The Theft of Culture and the Extinction ofArchaeolog 64-86 (Routledge 2002).
15 For a list of state parties, see <http://erc.unesco.org/cp/convention.asp?KO=13637&
language=E> (visited Apr 21, 2007).
16 For a list of state parties, see <http://erc.unesco.org/cp/convention.asp?KO=15391&
language=E> (visited Apr 21, 2007).
17 For a list of state parties, see <http://erc.unesco.org/cp/convention.asp?KO=15207&
language=E> (visited Apr 21, 2007).
18 Kanchana Wangkeo, Monumental Challenges: The Lawfulness of Destroying Cultural Heritage during
Peacetime, 28 YaleJ Ind L 183, 243-51 (2003).
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marking cultural property and preparing storage sites in advance of war-seem
to enjoy only limited compliance among secure and peaceful states. 9
None of this proves that the Hague regime has had no effect, but if it has
had an effect, it has been quite limited.
2. The Peacetime Trade in Illegal Antiquities
Cultural property is not always moveable-it includes buildings, for
example-but moveable cultural property can be, and frequently is, exported.
States generally permit owners of recently produced cultural property to sell and
export it, but most states restrict ownership and export of antiquities. Despite
these restrictions, there is a flourishing international market in exported
antiquities, driven by the demand of museums and private collectors. To meet
this demand, ordinary people-not archeologists-remove antiquities from the
ground or wherever they are located, and sell them to smugglers, who in turn sell
them to international dealers. The removal of the items is usually not done
carefully, with the result that the item removed or items left behind may be
damaged. Furthermore, removal rarely conforms with archeological norms, with
the result that important contextual information is lost. In extreme cases, looters
may break items into pieces because fragments are more easily concealed and
transported than unbroken items and are valued by buyers despite the damage
done to the original items.
The illegal trade in antiquities thus produces a number of harms. First, the
antiquities are frequently damaged. Second, scholarly information is lost because
archeological norms are violated. Third, the origin country loses the antiquities
to foreign countries, which many people find objectionable for reasons that I
will discuss below. Fourth, purchased antiquities usually disappear into private
collections and cannot be studied by scholars or appreciated by people who care
about cultural property.
Concerns about the illegal trade in antiquities have existed for decades. The
origin states, which were often poor countries with weak institutions, could do
little to prevent looters from extracting antiquities and sought assistance from
the wealthy states to which the antiquities were exported. Prior to the UNESCO
Convention, states generally prohibited the import and trade of stolen property,
but did not prohibit the import of property in violation of export restrictions.
Because of the difficulty of proving that the owner of an antiquity engaged in
19 See Patrick J. Boylan, Review of the Convention for the Protection of Cultural Propery in the Event of Armed
Conflict (The Hague Convention of 1954) 5.37, 8.6 (UNESCO 1993), available online at
<http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0O0O/001001/100159eo.pdf> (visited Apr 21, 2007)
(noting limited peacetime preparation for protection of cultural property in war and 20 percent
compliance rate in the issuing of reports).
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criminal behavior, domestic law did not provide any deterrent. 21 The UNESCO
Convention was intended to address the problem of the international antiquities
market more directly by encouraging importing nations to prohibit importation
of goods that were exported from origin countries in violation of export
restrictions. Thus, the goods would not be permitted to cross the border.
One-hundred two states have ratified the UNESCO Convention, 21 but
conventional wisdom holds that the convention has failed to halt or erode the
black market in illicit antiquities. 2 One can point to a few local successes, but
they have more to do with domestic politics and conditions than with the overall
effectiveness of the treaty regime itself.
23
B. WHY HAVE THE TREATY REGIMES FAILED?
Commentators have suggested several reasons why the treaty regimes have
failed.
1. Existing Treaties Are Not Sufficiently Precise, or Do Not Have
Strong Enough Language
Both the Hague Convention and the UNESCO Convention have vague
language, and states can avoid the spirit of the instruments by asserting their
compliance with the literal meaning of the words. For example, the Hague
Convention obligated states to "respect" cultural property, without further
elaboration.24 By contrast, article 7 of the Second Optional Protocol requires
states to "do everything feasible to verify that the objectives to be attacked are
not cultural property." The language of the Second Optional Protocol is
stronger and more detailed. But few states have ratified the Second Optional
Protocol.
This criticism may reflect some of the truth. All things equal, stronger
obligations should result in greater cooperation. But all things are not equal.
States clearly do not want to take on strong obligations; this is why 114 states
have acquiesced in the vague Hague Convention, while only 44 states have
20 Paul M. Bator, An Essay on the International Trade in Art, 34 Stan L Rev 275, 285-89 (1982),
reprinted in Paul M. Bator, The International Trade in Art 9-13 (Chicago 1983).
21 See UNESCO, List of the 102 States Panies, available online at <http://www.unesco.org/
culture/laws/1 970/htmleng/page3.shtml> (visited Apr 21, 2007).
22 See John Henry Merryman, Two Ways of Thinking about Cultural Property, 80 Am J Intl L 831, 848-
49 (1986), reprinted in Merryman, Thinking about the Elgin Marbles 85-86 (cited in note 2);
Greenfield, Return of Cultural Treasures at 257-61 (cited in note 6).
23 The complex landscape has been surveyed in Greenfield, Return of Cultural Treasures at 253-316
(cited in note 6) and many other works.
24 Hague Convention, art 4 (cited in note 5).
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consented to the Second Protocol. To understand why the treaty regime has
failed, one must understand why states have not agreed to stronger obligations
than those embodied in existing instruments that have been widely ratified.
2. Existing Treaties Do Not Have Enough Parties
As noted above, the Hague Convention has 116 parties but the Second
Protocol has only 44 parties. The UNESCO Convention has 103 parties. The
US is not a party to the Hague regime but does acknowledge it as customary
international law. The US is a party to the UNESCO Convention. One might
think that if more states joined these treaties, compliance with them would be
more widespread.
The problem with this view is that existing parties do not take the treaty
regimes seriously. If existing parties do not take the treaty regimes seriously,
there is no reason to think that new parties would take them seriously either. As
one indication of the problem, consider the Hague Convention's provision that
requires states to provide reports to UNESCO that detail their compliance
efforts.25 Although the provision is not obligatory, it is nonetheless striking that
fewer than a quarter of parties have issued these reports, and the reports
themselves in most cases describe at best perfunctory efforts to comply with the
treaty regime.26 The UNESCO Convention obligates states to take steps to
prohibit the illicit trade in antiquities, and yet no state invests significant
resources in this effort. The US and Britain, for example, have only a handful of
agents involved in prosecuting illegal traders and most countries have one or
zero.
27
3. Existing Treaties Do Not Have Strong Enough Enforcement
Mechanisms
Some treaties, such as the treaty that created the World Trade
Organization, establish institutions that are supposed to administer the treaty
and sometimes adjudicate treaty disputes. UNESCO has some power but not
much. The Second Protocol creates a committee that is supposed to administer
the Hague regime, but the committee has little power. Would a stronger
international cultural property organization strengthen the treaty regime?
Perhaps, but such an institution is not a realistic possibility. Very few effective
international organizations exist because states are unwilling to trust
international organizations to serve their interests. Similarly, it is difficult to
imagine that states or international organizations like the International Criminal
25 Id, art 26.
26 See Boylan, Review of the Convention 8.6 (cited in note 19).
27 Matthew Bogdanos and William Patrick, Thieves of Baghdad 272 (Bloomsbury 2005).
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Court would devote significant resources to prosecuting looters and traders if
violations of treaties were treated as international crimes, as many scholars
advocate.28
4. Governments Do Not Have a Strong Interest in Committing to
Protect, or Not to Harm, Cultural Property
The vague language, the lack of ratifications, and the absence of a strong
international organization reflect a deeper problem-that governments do not
want to commit themselves to expend significant resources to protect foreign
cultural property during wartime or peacetime.
This might seem surprising, given that governments have gone to the
trouble of creating the two treaty regimes, that governments say that they care
deeply about cultural property, and that governments clearly do care about their
own cultural property. But governments have other priorities, and as
international cooperation is difficult even when governments have strong and
shared interests, it is not surprising that international cooperation to protect
cultural property has been unsatisfactory.
The peacetime regime has failed because governments have mixed motives
about the treatment of cultural property. The strongest proponents of export
restrictions are mainly poor countries, which do not have enough resources even
to police their own territory, and certainly do not have enough leverage
internationally to compel wealthy states to prosecute illegal traders. Within the
wealthy states, museums, traders, and collectors want to keep the trade in
antiquities alive, and they pressure the government to reject strong international
obligations to shut down the trade. Thus, the wealthy states have been lukewarm
about protecting foreign cultural property, although they do protect their own.29
The wartime regime has failed in part because some governments have a
policy of destroying the cultural property of the enemy. Thus, armies and
paramilitary groups during the Yugoslav civil war targeted cultural property of
the enemy in order to demoralize the local population and drive it off desired
territory.
Even well-meaning governments find themselves unable to protect cultural
property during wartime. Consider the recent events in Iraq. Although the US is
not a party to the Hague regime, it has said that it regards that regime as
customary international law, and it also clearly had no interest in destroying
28 See, for example, Andrea Cunning, The Safeguarding of Cultural Property in Times of War & Peace, 11
TulsaJ Comp & Intl L 211 (2003).
29 Some governments, such as the Taliban government in Afghanistan, deliberately destroy their
own cultural property for ideological and political reasons. Foreign states cannot, as a practical
matter, intervene.
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Iraq's cultural property. Some have argued that the widespread looting and
destruction of Iraq's cultural property in the aftermath of the American invasion
would not have occurred, or would have been minimized, if the US had ratified
the Hague Convention and one or both of its protocols, or if more elaborate
international treaties protecting cultural property had been in place. This does
not seem correct. The looting of Iraq's cultural treasures in the aftermath of the
American invasion was not caused by a defect in international law. The US, as an
occupying power, had a general international legal obligation to maintain law and
order in Iraq, and this general obligation included the specific obligation of
preventing theft, whether of antiquities or of automobiles. The US tried to do
so, but failed because it did not have enough forces in place, could not afford to
muster additional military forces, and underestimated the problems of law and
order that would occur in the wake of the invasion. The problem was not just
looting of cultural property; it was looting of everything-office furniture in
government buildings, inventories of warehouses and retail stores, cars, wiring,
books, factory equipment, and so on. America's priority was protection of oil
facilities, whose revenues would be necessary for reconstruction, and whose
destruction would cause another environmental disaster, as occurred when
Saddam's army set ablaze Kuwaiti oil wells during the first Gulf War. The
insurgency has made it impossible for the US to do more than provide the
rudiments of security over the last several years.
It thus seems unlikely that the US would have prevented the looting of the
Baghdad Museum and thousands of archeological sites if it had ratified a treaty
obligating it to protect Iraq's cultural property. If treaty instruments had required
the US to divert resources from general security, the protection of Iraqi
ministries, and the reconstruction of sewage treatment plants, electric facilities,
and oil pipelines, this would only have fueled the insurgency, and would surely
have been considered intolerable by American officials and the Iraqis
themselves. The US would have gone ahead and violated these treaties with the
approval or indifference of most of the world. Diversion of military and
economic resources to protect cultural property would most certainly not have
that effect if the consequence was anarchy and civil war, which would surely
have hastened the destruction of Iraq's cultural property.
III. WHAT IS SPECIAL ABOUT CULTURAL PROPERTY?
The assumption that cultural property is special, and therefore deserving of
special legal protection, is so deeply ingrained that the question, "What is special
about cultural property?," might seem silly. To see that the question is not silly,
consider the reaction of local populations after the collapse of communist rule in
Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union-they tore down the statues of
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communist heroes such as Lenin and Stalin. This reaction repeated itself after
the US invasion of Iraq, when Iraqis tore down statues of Saddam.3°
Thus, it is clear that not all cultural property is valuable to the citizens of
origin states, only some is. How does one tell the difference between valuable
and valueless cultural property? One might try to rely on objective aesthetic or
scholarly criteria applied by experts, but one could hardly have demanded that
Polish or Hungarian citizens not tear down aesthetically valuable statues of
communists while permitting them to tear down the aesthetically objectionable
statues. Such a judgment would make a mockery of the symbolic behavior of the
crowds-to express their repudiation of the communist legacy.
A starting point is that cultural property, like any other form of property, is
valuable to the extent that people care about it and are willing to pay to consume
or enjoy it. If cultural property is "normal" property, then there is no reason to
regulate it, or to treat it as different from other forms of property. In an
unregulated market, the people who value it most will buy it. If a great many
people value it, then we might observe what we in fact observe in many
settings-museums purchasing the most valuable cultural property and showing
it to numerous people for a fee. In a similar way, we have a mostly unregulated
market in modern artworks. Some art is purchased for private collections, but
most ends up in museums or in shows where the general public may see it.
Against this baseline, is there any reason to think that cultural property
should receive special treatment? A number of theories have been proposed; the
two that seem to be most influential are as follows.
A. BOND WITH THE PAST
The most influential idea is that a particular people has a right to
possession of its cultural property because possession of cultural property is
important to the dignity of a people.3' There are several difficulties with this
argument, however. First, it is not clear what it means for a "people" to
"possess" cultural property. In practice, proponents of this idea mean that the
cultural property should be stored in museums located in the territory of the
state in which the people live, but why should this satisfy the requirement of
possession? Is it necessary for the people to be able to see the cultural property?
What if, as a practical matter, a state can only store its cultural property, or most
of it, in warehouses, or must leave it in the ground? Is it sufficient if some (or
30 See Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, The Right to Destroy, 114 Yale LJ 781, 825 (2005).
31 For an argument roughly to this effect, see Patty Gerstenblith, Identio and Cultural Propery: The
Protection of Cultural Propery in the United States, 75 BU L Rev 559 (1995).
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many) people in the relevant population own the cultural property and keep it
stored in their houses?
Second, many local populations do not value cultural property. If people in
a particular culture simply do not value artifacts from the past, should they
nonetheless be required to store them in museums? Should they be forbidden to
destroy them? As noted above, it seems odd to say that citizens of Poland had
an obligation to preserve statues of communist leaders. The history of
iconoclasm is long; are all iconoclastic movements to be condemned because
they destroy cultural property?
Third, the moral basis of the "bond with the past" idea is also obscure.
Iraqis today have little in common with the people who lived in Mesopotamia
thousands of years ago. Much the same can be said about the people living in
Greece, Italy, and India. Massive migrations have ensured that ancestral lines
have been broken; the people who live in Italy today are descendants of people
who lived in northern Europe or Asia. Most of the descendants of the ancient
Greeks probably live in Turkey and other parts of western Asia. Of course, even
if people could show that their ancestors produced cultural property they claim
today, it is far from clear that they have a moral claim to the property. After all,
the ancestors may have sold the cultural property, or thrown it away, or
abandoned it. But in the absence of even this type of claim based on ancestry,
the moral basis of a modern people's claim to cultural property is questionable.32
One might respond that, at least, a people should possess cultural property
that was produced by their ancestors. But this response illustrates the oddness of
the "bond with the past" argument. Consider modern cultural property-say,
artworks that are being produced by living artists. No one believes that a
painting finished yesterday by an American artist should stay in America, and be
imprisoned in an American museum, on the grounds that American cultural
property should stay on American soil. Although the painting is not (yet) part of
our past, it will be part of our past in the future, but by then it might be lost to a
private collector in Tokyo or London. This possibility does not seem to bother
anyone. People have a strange set of intuitions, according to which local art
should be bought and sold, and exported to other countries, where its presence
can only honor our country; but as time passes, the people who happen to live in
the geographic area where the art was produced, but have no relationship with
the artist or the artist's descendants, have a stronger and stronger claim on the
art, so that at some point they are justified in demanding its return.
32 Kwame Anthony Appiah, Whose Culture Is It?, NY Rev of Books 38, 38-39 (Feb 9, 2006);
Merryman, 80 Am J Intl L 831 (cited in note 22). See also Bator, 34 Stan L Rev 275 (cited in note
20).
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The only explanation I can see for this phenomenon is that people make a
moral error: they anthropomorphize peoples. At some point, the art ceases to
belong to a particular person (the artist, the buyer, the subsequent buyer, and so
on) and starts to belong to a people (the population occupying the territory on
which the artist lived, or related ethnically or racially to the artist). As time
passes, the people's claim strengthens and any particular person's claim weakens.
If this is the correct description of human psychology, it nonetheless is difficult
to defend on moral grounds. The current possessor has a strong claim if he or
she purchased the artwork (rather than stole it, in which case the victim would
have the strong claim). If the people have a strong enough psychological need for
the artwork, they can always purchase it through a government or museum.
They do not have any moral right to possession.
Fourth, a related idea is that a people should have access to their cultural
property so that they can learn about their history or, I should say, the history of
the peoples who lived on the territory that they now occupy. The educational
value of cultural property is similar to its scholarly value, which I will discuss
below. It is sufficient to point out here that the educational value can be
exploited without strict regulation of cultural property. Photographs and models
will often be sufficient for the purpose of education, so it seems doubtful that
the educational importance of cultural property justifies a prohibition on trade
or export. International treaties could provide that institutional owners of
cultural property like museums and governments should arrange for periodic
traveling exhibitions.
B. CULTURAL PROPERTY HAS SCHOLARLY VALUE AND
DEPENDS ON CONTEXT
Cultural property has two features that distinguish it from other natural
resources such as oil. First, it has scholarly and aesthetic value. It provides a
window into the past and often (but not always) has intrinsic artistic merit.
Second, its scholarly and aesthetic value depends greatly on its careful handling.
When antiquities are removed from archeological sites, care must be used so that
their context is understood and recorded, and the object itself is not damaged.
Modern artworks also have cultural value and many of them have scholarly
value. Yet they may be bought and sold on the market; with limited exceptions,
the owner of an artwork has the right to store and transport it without taking
adequate care, to damage, or even destroy it. It is wrong to say that it is a matter
of indifference to the world when the owner of valuable art does not properly
care for it because people clearly do care about the treatment of artworks, even
artworks they never see. But there is good reason to think that the art will
flourish in a free market to a much greater degree than in a controlled market
that restricts buyers' ability to dispose of their purchases however they see fit.
VoL 8 No. 1
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When people are not constrained, there is greater demand for art, which pulls
more artists into the market. Because people care about the art they purchase,
they usually take care of it. And when art is significant enough on cultural
grounds, it will usually be purchased by, or given to, museums. The market is
not perfect, but seems to work well enough.
Is there any reason to think that the cultural and aesthetic value of cultural
property justifies regulation of the cultural property market? Archeologists worry
that in an unregulated market, people will extract cultural property from the
earth without taking care to prevent damage, and without recording the
contextual details, and so forth. They fear that traders will break apart large
objects because the public has a fetishistic desire for old things and prefer
fragments to nothing at all. And they fear that valuable antiquities will disappear
into private collections, where they will be unavailable for public and scholarly
inspection.
All of these concerns are justified, but they seem no more justified than the
fear that people will buy valuable artworks and then damage them. This
happens, but it does not happen as much as one might fear precisely because
undamaged art is worth more than damaged art. Similarly, we should consider
the possibility that antiquities are treated poorly today because they are so
heavily regulated. Looters fear detection by the police; that is why they remove
antiquities without taking care. If it were legal to remove cultural property and
sell it, then professionals would take over and use care because antiquities are
worth more when their provenance is known and when they are undamaged.
We should also expect cultural property to remain available for public and
scholarly inspection to the same extent that modern art is. Many products will be
purchased by private collectors, but many will also be purchased by museums
and put on public display. Like the case of modern art, private purchasers of
cultural property will lend it to museums and even donate it for tax benefits or
for altruistic reasons. If the market were legal, then light forms of regulation-
for example, the requirement that sales of cultural property be recorded-could
ensure that antiquities are not lost, so that scholars could ask current owners for
permission to study the object in question, and museums would be able to track
down objects that they would like to purchase.
In sum, no one has provided a convincing argument that cultural property
should be treated differently from art, oil, and other cultural and natural
resources. An unregulated or lightly regulated market in cultural property would
look like these other markets. A lightly regulated market might be justified
because of some of the special features of cultural property; in particular,
recording requirements may be justified.
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IV. THE LAWS OF WAR
The laws of war have long required belligerents to avoid causing
unnecessary damage to property-private or public-that does not have a
military function, or is not used by opposing forces during hostilities. The laws
also require occupying powers to maintain law and order among subject
populations, and this, of course, means preventing looting, punishing theft, and
so forth. We can think of these laws as providing a baseline of respect for
property in general.
As we have discussed, cultural property is not different from property in
general. It has special features, but so do all forms of property; none of these
features suggest that cultural property deserves greater protection under
international law than ordinary property does. Thus, the 1954 Hague regime,
which does enhance international protection of cultural property during
wartime, poses a puzzle. What function might it have?
Let us consider this puzzle from a practical perspective. A belligerent seeks
to win a war. To win the war, it must destroy the military assets of the enemy.
Most belligerents do not want to destroy civilian property when doing so can be
avoided. There are two related reasons for this. First, belligerents often rely on
the goodwill of the inhabitants of occupied territory. Goodwill is most cheaply
purchased when the belligerent enforces law and order and restrains its own
forces from abuses. Second, belligerents will often want to exploit local
resources for their own purposes.
These belligerents have limited resources, and must decide how they
should be used to protect nonmilitary property. Suppose, for example, that the
belligerent must choose between using soldiers to protect an oil well or to
protect an archeological site-which should it protect? If left to its own devices,
the belligerent will protect whichever property is worth more. By doing so, it
maximizes the goodwill of the civilian population, and its own ability to exploit
local resources.
It is possible, of course, that the local population will care more about the
cultural property than about the oil, but if this is so, the belligerent has every
incentive to take account of the population's views.
Not all belligerents are so benign. Some belligerents do not seek to mollify
the local population but to drive it off the land. We saw an example of this
phenomenon in the Yugoslav civil war. Belligerents targeted cultural property;
they did not target natural resources. Presumably, the reason was that they
expected to exploit the natural resources for their own benefit, but placed no
value on the cultural property, and instead believed that destroying it would
make clear to the local population that it was expected to leave.
In this situation, special international protection of cultural property is
easier to understand. Such a regime attempts to solve the problem that a
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belligerent may place less value on the cultural property than its intrinsic worth,
as measured by the market or by the sentiments of the people who care about it.
However, for several reasons the view that international humanitarian law
can ensure meaningful protection of cultural property in war zones is
implausible. First, consider the general rule that belligerents should respect
civilian property. Relatively benign states that seek to control, rather than
cleanse, local populations have the right incentives to comply with that rule, and
to give as much priority to cultural property as its value justifies relative to other
considerations, such as protection of ordinary private and government property,
maintaining order, and so forth. A stronger rule that required the benign states
to protect cultural property would not improve their incentives and could,
conceivably, interfere with the desirable allocation of resources by forcing states
to protect cultural property more than other types of property that are more
important or valuable. Meanwhile, malevolent states or governments that seek to
engage in ethnic cleansing will not pay attention to international law protecting
cultural property. After all, if they are already violating laws against genocide and
crimes against humanity, they are not likely to pay attention to the Hague
Convention and its protocols.
Second, even if we confine our attention to the relatively benign, law-
abiding state, it is far from clear what it would mean for a treaty to require a
belligerent to give enhanced protection to cultural property. As noted above, the
general laws of war already prohibit belligerents from targeting, and failing to
protect nonmilitary property. Stronger rules that force belligerents to devote
more resources to protecting cultural property, so that cultural property received
greater protection relative to, say, oil facilities would be extremely difficult to
draft. A rule that prohibited states from targeting cultural property even in cases
of military necessity would not be accepted. A rule requiring states to protect all
cultural property is not practicable-the US simply could not have protected all
ten thousand archeological sites in Iraq. A rule requiring the belligerent to
devote "substantial" resources to protecting cultural property, or protecting
cultural property when doing so is "feasible," would leave the belligerent with
the same amount of discretion that it has under the general rule.
Third, states enter treaties and comply with them only when they have an
interest in doing so, and this can exist only when there is the possibility of a quid
pro quo. Belligerents agree to treat captured soldiers in a humane fashion only in
order to induce the enemy to treat their POWs humanely as well.33 Here, we
must imagine that belligerents would agree to respect enemy cultural property in
return for the enemy's promise to respect the belligerent's cultural property. In
principle, a deal is possible; in practice, history has shown that belligerents just
33 For a discussion, see Eric A. Posner, Terrorism and the Laws of War, 5 Chi J Intl L 423 (2005).
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do not value their own cultural property enough to be willing to make this type
of deal. Major military powers-say, the US, China, Russia, and India-know
that they might want to intervene in another country and are not willing to
submit to significant constraints on military discretion. Smaller, archeologically
rich countries enter these treaties but never expect to engage in military
interventions in other countries, so the treaties do not work as meaningful
constraints. Thus, the military powers gain little from entering into these treaties,
and that is why the Hague Convention has such weak language, few states have
entered the Second Protocol, and compliance has been limited in any event.
In sum, the justification for laws of war that protect cultural property is
weaker than ordinarily recognized. Generally law-abiding belligerents have the
right incentives to protect cultural property; laws requiring special protection for
cultural property could only reduce their ability to control territory. Generally ill-
disposed belligerents have the wrong incentives, and laws requiring special
protection for cultural property are unlikely to improve them.
V. THE UNESCO CONVENTION
The UNESCO Convention encourages states to respect export restrictions
imposed by origin states. To understand the purpose of this instrument, suppose
that an origin state such as Italy or Mexico has no export restriction but does
make it a crime to remove and sell antiquities taken from private or government
property. A person who loots an archeological site and sells it to an international
trader commits the crime, and the trader is probably guilty as well. If the trader
is not caught and exports the antiquity to a recipient state such as the US or
Switzerland, then the trader is likely guilty of dealing in stolen property in the
recipient state, and so may be a national of the recipient state who buys the
antiquity. But as a practical matter, it is unlikely that either the trader or the
buyer will be prosecuted under the criminal law of the recipient state. The
government of the origin state would need to inform the recipient state of the
suspected theft, but the government is unlikely to know about it. Even if it did,
it will be difficult for law enforcement of the recipient state to track down the
stolen object, and the law enforcement officials are unlikely to be willing to
spend significant resources doing so. Then it will be difficult to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the trader or the buyer knew that the property was
stolen-witnesses and records, if any, will be in the origin state. For all these
reasons, prosecutions for theft of antiquities in recipient states remain unusual.
Suppose now that the origin state creates export restrictions. This alone
will have little effect on the problem. The export restriction prohibits the trader
from exporting the antiquities; this means that border control agents of the
origin state might search people's luggage for antiquities and confiscate them if
they are found. But borders are porous, and most often smugglers will be able to
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find a way around border control agents or will be able to bribe them. The
recipient state's border agents will not confiscate the antiquities if they find
them; they have no obligation to do so.
The function of the UNESCO Convention is to encourage the recipient
state to pass laws directing border control agents to confiscate goods whose
importation violates the export restrictions of the origin state. The recipient
state's border control agents are likely to be better trained, more numerous, and
less easily bribed than the origin state's agents, because origin states tend to be
poor (Italy is an exception) and recipient states tend to be wealthy. The recipient
state will not necessarily prosecute the trader but it will confiscate the antiquities
and return them to the government of the origin state.
The extra layer of border control no doubt deters smuggling at the margin,
but there is no systematic evidence that the effect is significant (there is a little
anecdotal evidence), and the general view is that the illegal market in antiquities
is worse today than it was in 1970. It may be that recipient states just do not care
enough about the illegal antiquities trade to put the necessary resources into
stopping it. What is true is that enforcement is significant enough that there is a
black market, which means that the trades are hidden from view.
The current international approach to the market in antiquities is ill-
advised. Calls for greater investment in law enforcement34 would, if heeded, only
make things worse. Rather than creating an artificial black market, states should
try to create a legal market which could then be lightly regulated in order to
correct some of the problems of the antiquities market.
To reach this goal, the recipient states should stop respecting the export
restrictions of origin states, and should encourage origin states to eliminate
export restrictions and decriminalize the ownership and trading of antiquities.
(Many states do allow some ownership and trade, but usually not of the most
valuable objects.) Some recipient states may willingly change their rules, given
that existing rules seem to have little effect. Others may change their rules if they
receive aid or assistance. As I discuss in more detail below, some of the features
of a legal market should be attractive to origin as well as recipient states.
This system would have several advantages. First, a legal market would be
more transparent than the existing black market. Traders would have no reason
to hide their identities; owners would be more willing to publicize their
ownership in order to attract buyers. As a result, scholars would have less
trouble tracking down antiquities they wish to study, and governments that
would like to buy valuable cultural property would have less trouble finding it. If
the market were legal, then prospectors could extract cultural property from the
34 See, for example, Bogdanos and Patrick, Thieves of Baghdad at 272 (cited in note 27).
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soil in the open, more slowly, in daylight, with more care, and with more
attention to context. Because antiquities are more valuable when their
provenance is known, prospectors would be more likely to hire professional
archeologists to remove and record objects, and verify their identity. This would
add to the sum of knowledge, improve scholarship, and improve the handling of
antiquities.35
Second, if the market were legal, then trade in antiquities could be subject
to taxation and limited regulation. I will address regulation below. Taxation is of
great importance because many origin states are extremely poor. In addition, the
foreign exchange used to purchase antiquities could be used to purchase needed
goods from abroad.
Third, one of the benefits of a free market in cultural property is that much
cultural property would leave poor, insecure states that suffer from war,
corruption, and inefficient law enforcement, and be stored in wealthy, secure
states. In their self-interest, commercial firms would remove cultural property
from war zones and potential war zones, and of course eventually most cultural
property would be sold to museums and private collections located in secure,
first-world countries. If the contents of the Baghdad Museum had been owned
and held by museums located in New York, Tokyo, London, or Chicago, they
would never have been stolen or destroyed during the second Gulf War.
As noted above, the market need not be wholly unregulated, as long as the
regulations are not so severe as to recreate the incentive to smuggle. Regulation
could serve several purposes. It could require that prospectors and traders
record their transactions and place the record in public files. It could create
minimum standards of care in the extraction, preservation, transportation, and
storage of antiquities. To address the educational aspects of cultural property,
states could agree that recipient states would, from time to time, fund loans from
museums and private collectors back to origin states for limited periods of time.
VI. CONCLUSION
There is no point in pretending that deregulating the international market
in cultural property is a panacea. There would be many abuses and frustrations.
Much cultural property would disappear into private collections, of course;
much would be damaged as a result of careless handling; and origin states will
continue to be frustrated that "their" cultural property is scattered around the
globe. Part of my solution is just to define away the problem by way of a claim
that origin states do not have a strong moral right to the cultural property
created by predecessor populations. But this is another way of saying that the
35 See Merryman, Two Ways of Tbinking about Cultural Property at 86-87 (cited in note 22).
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goals of the current regime are not justified; and if the goals are not justified, or
have a weak justification, then all the damage created by the current regime is
inexcusable.
The current regime may well have been motivated by outrage on the part
of origin states, and guilt on the part of recipient states, that so much property
really has been stolen from recipient states-that is, looted by western armies or
explorers, rather than purchased. These are historical controversies that I do not
address. But whatever the motivation of the current regime, one must recognize
that its flaws result from its fundamental assumptions rather than from technical
problems that could be corrected through marginal reform.
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